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et al.: Panel Discussion

PANEL DISCUSSION
Hon. George C. Pratt:
As to our formal presentations, we have reached the end.
Before we take a few minutes for questions from the audience, let
me go to you, Barry, as our visiting professor. Have you
anything additional that you would like to add, any comments,
questions?
ProfessorBarry C. Scheck:
Yes. Just along the same lines that you raised the repressed
memory cases. Incidentally, it is the same experts, Dr. Elizabeth
Loftus, Dr. Martin Orne. Another fascinating subset of these
problems has to do with child sexual abuse cases. What I would
recommend to your attention are the recently published studies of
a Dr. Stephen Ceci that were in the New England Journal of
Medicine. You might have seen it; I know they had it on 20/201
because a lot of them were videotapes. These are fascinating
studies. What Dr. Ceci stated about many of the child sexual
abuse cases is that there has been this assumption among experts
that children do not lie. 2 Frankly, as a father, it always struck me
as incredible that people will take this view. What Dr. Ceci did is
interview a child ten consecutive times and he would have the
videotape going as the child was interviewed. You would see that
on the third interview, talking about a plane trip, the child would
all of a sudden start talking about some incredible event that
occurred on the plane trip, and then by the tenth interview, he
would have all these incredibly elaborate details about how the

1. See 20/20: From the Mouths of Babes (ABC television broadcast, Oct.
22, 1993).

2. Dr. Ceci stated in the broadcast that "It]he problem is that from a
research standpoint we are now discovering that if you put kids who were not
abused through the same kind of highly leading, repetitive interview, some of
those children will also disclose events that seem credible but, in fact, are not
borne in actuality." Id.
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stewardess came over. It was what was said that made it sound
very real .3
However, the one that really brought it home to me was the
videotape he showed of a child being interviewed about a
pediatric examination. A pediatrician examines the child, just a
normal physical checkup, and then by the third interview, the
child, being interviewed with anatomical dolls, talks about how
the pediatrician stuck a stick up the child's anus. 4 You saw a
videotape of the examination of the child, so you know that that
did not happen, and then you see the series of interviews. 5 So, it
is very startling stuff that has changed the way a lot of these child
sexual abuse case interviews are going, and I think a lot of it has
to do with the nature of human memory, its plasticity, what we
know about retrieval mechanisms, confabulations, suggestibility,
and I think that these repressed memory cases, the hypnosis cases
and some of these cases are all of kind.
Hon. George C. Pratt:

I suspect, also, that what we are learning in these areas are
going to require us to re-examine a lot of other areas of the law
of evidence as to what our assumptions have been and how
reliable they are. Debbie Bartel, you told me you had something
particular you wanted to mention here.

3. Dr. Ceci gave an example of some of the questioning.
They say to the child, "We want you to tell us what Kelly did." The kid
says, "I don't remember." [They say to the child,] "Oh yes, you do.
You remember." [The child replies,] "No, I don't remember." [They
say,] "You do so. We know you remember." At this point the child
starts crying, "I want to get out of here." [They say,] "You're not going
anywhere [un]til [sic] you tell us what we know you know."
Id.
4. Id.

5. Id.
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ProfessorDeborah Staville Bartel:

I wanted to comment on something that Barry said earlier. I am
used to having the last say. Barry was a defense attorney and I
was a prosecutor. I always got the rebuttal summation.
Barry was troubled about notice requirements being violated
resulting in the preclusion of possibly potent evidence
demonstrating the innocence of a defendant, and that such
preclusion might occur even if the defendant had not himself
engaged in the tactical decision to violate the notice requirements
in the hope of gaining a tactical advantage. 6 I am not so troubled
about wrongful convictions resulting, and the reason that i am
not is, first of all, courts have the power to construe the term
defendant to require that the defendant be complicitous in the
tactical decision. The decision in Taylor v.Illinois7 reads that the

defendant's tactical decision not to comply with the notice
requirements was deliberate. 8 Barry seemed less troubled if the
defendant had himself been complicitous. Whether the defendant
had or had not been complicitous, if he makes the deliberate
decision to avoid the notice requirements resulting in preclusion
of potent evidence demonstrating innocence, whether he does that
with the assistance of his lawyer or whether the lawyer does it
alone, the question to be asked is whether a conviction should
result based on a trial record that had precluded that evidence? I
think the defendant would have a very good claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel and a reversal of conviction. He ought to be
able to satisfy both problems of the ineffective assistance claims
if counsel's performance was so deficient that it is outside what is
ordinary in the community and there is prejudice to the extent
that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel's
deficient performance, the outcome might have been different.
For that reason, I think notice requirements, coupled with the
possibility of preclusion sanctions, are powerful tools for courts
6. See Barry C. Scheck, Eypert Testimuonr, 11 TOURO L. REv. 107
(1994).
7. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
8. The court in Taylor stated that "the inference that Ithe defendant] was
deliberately seeking a tactical advantage is inescapable." Id.at 417.
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to use to get defendants to comply with the court's rules. I am
not that concerned about possibly erroneous convictions. Is there
a surrebuttal?
ProfessorBarry C. Scheck:

I rely on the Brennan decision. 9 What else can I tell you?
Actually, my concern is, and I what think is really terrible about
this decision, is that we do not do enough to sanction lawyers. 10 I
mean, that is really where the sanction should be. If the defense
lawyer is purposely violating those rules for a strategic
advantage, sanction the person, get him out of the courts. If a
prosecutor is purposely withholding exculpatory evidence or
violating these rules, we do not do enough to sanction them
either. We do not even put their names on decisions sometimes.
Not nearly enough is done about that, frankly, in terms of these
sanctions. But, look, there was Taylor. He did not have an
ineffectiveness claim. So, it is troubling.
Hon. George C. Pratt:

Questions. Yes, sir?
Audience Member:

Professor Shaw, if we cannot define hypnosis, then how do we
know that somebody is under hypnosis? I never was convinced
whether somebody really is or is not, so I am not really sure

9. See generally id. at 419-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
in his dissent stated that "absent evidence of the defendant's personal
involvement in a discovery violation, the Compulsory Process Clause per se
bars discovery sanctions that exclude criminal defense evidence." Id. at 419
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. Justice Brennan would agree. He stated in his dissent that "Iiln the
absence of any evidence that a defendant played any part in an attorney's
willful discovery violation, directly sanctioning the attorney is not only fairer
but more effective in deterring violations than excluding defense evidence." Id.
at 433 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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myself. The other thing is an auxiliary question. Not knowing
what it is, how can one be helped if he or she uses it in therapy?
Professor Gary Shaw:

It is not that we do not know what hypnosis is. I can give you a
quick working definition of hypnosis. Hypnosis is a state of
heightened suggestibility and suspension of disbelief. 1 It is a
working definition, and psychologists rely on that working
definition. How it works, the means by which the suspension of
disbelief takes place and the hypersuggestibility takes place, and
confabulation takes place, the confabulation takes place because
of the suspension of disbelief. We know what happens during
hypnosis. We do not necessarily know the mechanisms by which
those things occur. There is a legitimate question. You do raise
an interesting question, though. How do we know when
somebody is under hypnosis? There have been cases in which the
issue has arisen whether the person was really under hypnosis, or
whether the person was lying when he or she said they were
under hypnosis and trying to fabricate positive evidence on their
own behalf. 12 There have also been cases where the court refuses
to find that the subject has been hypnotized, usually occurring

11. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). The Court in Rock stated

that "[h]ypnosis has been described as 'involv[ing] the focusing of attention;
increased responsiveness to suggestions; suspension of disbelief with a
lowering of critical judgment; potential for altering perception, motor control,
or memory in response to suggestions; and the subjective experience of
responding involuntarily.'" Id. at 59 n.17 (quoting Council on Scientific
Affairs, Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis,
253 JAMA 1918, 1919 (1985)); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 742 (6th

ed. 1990) (defining hypnosis as "[a] state of heightened concentration with
diminished awareness of peripheral events").
12. See State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 493

U.S. 1036 (1990). The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the trial
decision to exclude videotapes of the defendant's hypnotic and sodium
interviews from the jury's consideration because he found them
"sensational," the defendant to be "untruthful," and the tapes

court's
amytal
to be
to be

"unreliable." Id. at 515.
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where the hypnosis had been videotaped.

13

There are, however,

means in which you look at it and certain factors that you can
look at to try and

hypnotized.1 4 So,

determine

whether the

subject was

it is not, I should not say that it is completely

clear-cut, but in most instances psychologists or psychotherapists
who are trained in hypnosis have a pretty good idea of when the

person has entered that state of hypersuggestibility and
suspension of disbelief. It is not an issue that arises frequently.
Does that answer your question?
Audience Member:
How are they helped under therapy with it? Are they really
helped?
Professor Gary Shaw:
It has been accepted by the American Medical Association and

a number of other societies as indeed leading to therapy. 15 As to
how it does that, I am not sufficiently expert to be able to explain

it to you in a short period of time.
13. See generally id.; see also Barnes v. Henderson, 725 F. Supp. 442
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aft'd, 923 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
925 (1991). Tapes of hypnosis session were admitted into evidence, "thus
permitting the jury to assess the witness's credibility." Id. at 148.
14. Generally, the "potential unreliability" of statements produced during
hypnosis are reduced by observing safeguards. "New York has perhaps gone
the farthest in delineating these precautions." People v. Lucas, 107 Misc. 2d
231, 235, 435 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980). These
precautions include requirements that hypnosis should be "administered by a
mental health expert trained in hypnosis," that "the entire hypnotic session
should be videotaped," and that "evidence corroborative of or contradictory to
statements made during trance should be considered." Id. at 235-36, 435
N.Y.S.2d at 464.
15. See generally Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 11, at 1918
("'The use of hypnosis by appropriately trained physicians or psychologists has
been recognized as a valid therapeutic modality by the American Medical
Association since 1958.'"); Jack Martin, Hypnosis Gains Legitimacy, Respect,
in Diverse ClinicalSpecialties, 249 JAMA 319 (1983) (noting that in 1958 the
American Medical Association determined hypnosis "has a recognized place in
medicine").
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ProfessorBarry C. Scheck:
I think it actually arose at the end of the first world war; it was
the indicated treatment for trauma. 16
ProfessorGary Shaw:
For what we would call battle fatigue.
ProfessorBarry C. Scheck:
Because you went through some trauma and you cannot
remember it.
Professor Gary Shaw:
The reliving of it seems to have therapeutic benefits, as well.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Other questions? Yes, sir?
Audience Member:
I have a question about the Daubert17 test. I think I am
directing my comment to you, Professor Scheck. I briefly studied
it in evidence last semester so I am a little unclear about it. My
understanding was that the Daubert test was supposed to expand
what is admissible. I am wondering, when the judge is making
this determination, because now we are asking for his input, is he
not going to rely on what is just accepted in the community of
16. See, e.g., Gary M. Shaw, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced
Testimony in Criminal Trials, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 7 (1991) (stating that
"hypnosis was also used to a limited extent for the treatment of combat fatigue
in World Wars I and II"); William G. Traynor, Comment. The Admissibility of
Hypnotically Influenced Testinony, 55 TENN. L. REV. 785, 790 (stating that
during World War I "doctors found hypnosis useful for treating traumatic war
neuroses").
17. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.. 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993).
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science and thereby bring us back to Frye?18 I mean, if we are
asking the judge to really determine what is scientific and what is
not, and he is going to rely on the scientific community, he is
going to probably go with what is reasonably accepted in that
community anyway. So, are we back to Frye?
Professor Barry C. Scheck:
When I made that remark about spin control to Judge Pratt, 19 I
guess what I was really saying is that your visceral reaction is
correct; that is to say, generally that people might think that Frye
stated that scientific evidence is not admissible unless it is
generally accepted by the experts in the pertinent field. 20 So, in
theory, that would mean that you really have to wait a long time
before something is generally accepted. There are big debates.
Does that mean a consensus, or what is a consensus? Does it
mean a majority? The Sixth Circuit recently stated that general
acceptance does not even require a majority. 2 1 That is because
they did not have a majority, and the court wanted the evidence
in, so the Sixth Circuit said it does not require a majority. The
court did not cite anything, nobody has found that case yet, so it
stands for that proposition now. But yes, your general reaction is
that people think Daubert must mean that more things are going
to come in. In fact, it may mean that in certain instances. It may
mean that when you have new science that seems very reliable
because it is the product of beautiful experiments and it is very
solid, and the best people in the field are behind it. It may not be
18. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
19. See Gary M. Shaw, Trances, Trials, and Tribulations, II TOURo L.
REV. 145 (1994).
20. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.

21. See U.S. v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993). The court stated that
none of the theories or procedures used as scientific evidence "may have the

backing of the majority of scientists, yet the theory or procedure can still be
generally accepted." Id. at 562. To determine what scientific evidence should
be excluded, the Sixth Circuit determined, "ioInly when a theory or procedure
does not have the acceptance of most of the pertinent scientific community,

and in fact a substantial part of the scientific community disfavors the principle
or procedure, will it not be generally accepted." Id.
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as widely published as it need be, but people feel it is very good
and for certain purposes it would be accepted.

On the other hand, you are going to have a lot of science or a
lot of expert testimony now that is "generally accepted"; that is,
it has been coming in for years, that has no scientific basis, that
by the rigidity of Frye is kept in. So that is really what I was
addressing my remarks to. The other thing that Daubertdoes that
I should have pointed out is that Frye, in theory, discusses novel
scientific evidence. One clear thing the court did in Daubert is
state that it is not going to restrict itself to novel scientific
evidence. 22 By the terms of Rule 702,23 we are talking about

technical scientific, any kind of evidence of that nature is up for
grabs. It does not have to be "novel."
Professor Gary Shiv:
Can I add just one thing, and that is, I agree with much of what
Barry has said. I would simply add the question which may have
arisen, and one I intended to get to; is New York likely to follow
Daubert? In People v. Wesley 2 4 that just came down March 29,
the court rejected it. 25 The New York Court of Appeals, in a
footnote, stated that Daubert is not applicable here, we continue
22. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 2786 (1993). The Supreme Court acknowledged the respondent's argument
that "abandonment of 'general acceptance' as the exclusive requirement for
admission will result in a 'free-for-all' in which befuddled juries are
confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions." Id. at 2798.
The Court cited "vigorous cross examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, careful instruction on the burden of proof," and the ability of the
trial court to direct a judgment in the case that the "scintilla of evidence
presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to
conclude that the position more likely than not is true," as "appropriate
safeguards." Id.
23. FED. R. EvlD. 702. Rule 702 states that: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
24. 83 N.Y.2d 417, 633 N.E.2d 451, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1994).
25. Id. at 4234 n.2, 633 N.E.2d at 454 n.2, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 100 n.2.
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to apply Frye. Daubert does not apply because it is a matter of
statutory construction pursuant to Rule 702 and it has no place in
our analysis in Wesley dealing with the DNA. 2 6 So, it appears
that for the foreseeable future the New York Court of Appeals is
going to go with Frye and is not accepting Daubert.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Yes, sir?
Audience Member:
As far as New York is concerned, would you say there is a per
se rule against admissibility of hypnosis, or has the New York
Court of Appeals in any trends, ever held it to be admissible?
Professor Gary Shaw:
The Rock27 issue that I raised has not been discussed explicitly
by the New York Court of Appeals. The New York Court of
Appeals did say in another instance that hypnotically-enhanced
testimony is inadmissible for impeachment purposes. That is a
case called People v. Hults. 2 8 The court expressly stated that it is
sufficiently unreliable, that it is not even admissible for
impeachment purposes, let alone substantive reasons. 29 Now, the
30
interesting question, and one I want to track, is this Santana
26. Id. (stating that with respect to the New York courts "Daubert . ..is
not applicable here") (citation omitted).
27. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987) ("Arkansas' per se rule
excluding all posthypnosis testimony infringes impermissibly on the right of a
defendant to testify on his own behalf.").
28. People v. Hults, 76 N.Y.2d 190, 556 N.E.2d 1077, 557 N.Y.S.2d 270

(1990) (stating that defendant in sodomy case was precluded from using
complainant's hypnotic statements to impeach her testimony).
29. Id. at 192, 556 N.E.2d at 1078, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (stating that it is
established that hypnosis is not admissible as evidence-in-chief because of its
inherent unreliability, and holding that such statements are, as a general rule,
also inadmissible for impeachment purposes).
30. People v. Santana, 159 Misc. 2d 301, 604 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct.

Queens County 1993).
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case, because I think that Santana is actually inconsistent with
Hults. But that is a much longer discussion. For the moment, the
New York Court of Appeals has not taken that. I do not know
where it stands right now.
Audience Member:

Has there been any level court in New York that has admitted
hypnosis evidence?
ProfessorGary Shaw:

No, they are bound by the New York Court of Appeals in
Hughes,3 1 and I have not seen any court that said we are going to
disregard what the New York Court of Appeals said.
Hon. George C. Pratt:

Was there a question back here? No. All right, I want to thank
you all for your attention, and particularly to Deborah for
planning this whole program. It is concluded.

31. People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d
255 (1983), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908 (1989).
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